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SUMMARY 
Canada could be about to lose its tax competitive advantage it currently enjoys 
in attracting investment to its oil sector: its low corporate tax and royalty rates 
compared to the U.S. While we will start to know better the details of a U.S. tax 
reform package in the next month or so, two reform plans provide a basis to 
analyze potential impacts: the tax-reform “Blueprint” put forward last year by the 
Republican-controlled House of Representatives, and President Donald Trump’s own 
reform proposals. Either one, or even a hybrid version of the two, would make tax 
and royalty effective tax rates on new investment in the U.S. oil industry significantly 
more attractive to investors. Combined with the lack of any plans for a U.S. carbon 
tax and the lightening U.S. regulatory environment, investing in American oil might 
soon look more compelling than investing in Canadian oil. And when the price of oil 
eventually rises again, the attractiveness of Canada to international investors will 
diminish even more.
As an investment destination, Canada’s popularity has already been fading. One key 
index, measuring foreign-direct-investment confidence, shows the U.S. at the top, 
while Canada has slid from third place to fifth place, behind even Britain, despite so 
much Brexit uncertainty. Amid Canada’s rising tax burden and its growing regulatory 
load, however, oil-producing provinces have nevertheless managed to retain a 
competitive advantage against oil-producing U.S. states in attracting international 
capital. That is primarily due to a lower corporate tax rate in Canada, as well as 
competitive royalty regimes and, in most oil-producing provinces, the absence of a 
retail sales tax on capital equipment. 
Alberta, for example, which currently offers the lowest marginal effective tax and 
royalty rate (METRR) on conventional oil investments of all the Canadian provinces 
based on a $50 per barrel West Texas Intermediate price, also offers a lower METRR 
than nearly all comparable U.S. states measured (except Pennsylvania). But if the 
Republicans succeed in passing a version of their tax-reform proposals — and as 
a major campaign promise, they are facing great pressure to do so — Alberta will 
slide quickly from one of the best North American destinations for oil investments 
to somewhere in the middle of the pack, and Saskatchewan will become one of the highest-
taxed oil-producing jurisdictions. Should rising oil prices trigger higher royalty rates in both 
provinces, they will become even less competitive.
Even though the House plan proposes a less drastic cut to corporate income tax rates, it will 
actually do more than the president’s proposed tax reforms to eliminate Canada’s competitive 
edge and put the two countries METRRs virtually on par, due to the immediate deduction of 
capital expenditures.
While the prospect of the two countries ending up with roughly equal METRRs might sound 
less than worrisome, if it happens, Canada will lose the most significant advantages it has 
over the U.S. in attracting investment to its oil sector. The U.S. already enjoys the advantage 
of being a much larger market, and having a faster-growing economy, which is why it ranks 
as the most-preferred destination for foreign investment intentions. Investors also enjoy 
more regulatory certainty in the U.S., where the sector is being aggressively deregulated 
(as opposed to in Canada, where new and sometimes unexpected twists in the regulatory 
environment are becoming more common). And the U.S. still has no plans to implement a 
national carbon tax, while in Canada carbon taxes are expected to escalate over the next few 
years. With all these challenges to overcome, Canada's oil industry enjoyed one key edge to 
attract business - its lower tax burden, which soon it might lose as well.
1With the election of Donald Trump and Republican control of the House of Representatives and 
the Senate, U.S. policy developments have created both major opportunities and concerns for many 
businesses operating in Canada. Republican promises to reduce costly regulations, to enact tax 
reform and to increase trade protection could make U.S. markets stronger for Canadian exports. On 
the other hand, U.S. policy developments could also make Canadian investments less competitive 
compared to those in the United States. The 2017 A.T. Kearney FDI Confidence Index shows that 
the United States remains the top destination for capital investment due to its size and growing 
economy, even amid the uncertainties regarding the opportunities and costs of potential policy 
developments. Canada, however, has fallen from third to fifth place, behind the Brexit-challenged 
United Kingdom.1 
In this paper we measure the impact of potential U.S. tax reforms on Canadian competitiveness 
for the oil industry as well as update our estimates of effective tax rates on new investment for 
2017. As we reported in 2016, oil investments are taxed less heavily in Canada compared to the 
United States. This is primarily due to our lower corporate income tax rates (roughly 27 per cent) 
compared to the U.S. (about 38 per cent) and the absence of a retail sales tax on capital purchases in 
Canada, except in Saskatchewan and British Columbia (Manitoba, the only other province with a 
retail sales tax on capital purchases, does not have significant oil investment).2 We also have a more 
competitive royalty structure compared to some U.S. states, such as Texas and North Dakota. 
Should Republican tax reform result in a more competitive U.S. business structure, Canada will 
no longer enjoy its significant tax-competitive advantage in oil investments. If the U.S. corporate 
tax burden becomes similar to Canada’s, its recent deregulation and its lighter carbon polices 
will make the United States a more attractive destination for oil investments than Canada for 
international investors. 
The White House aspires to lower the U.S. federal corporate income tax rate to 15 per cent 
(roughly 21 per cent, with state taxes), which would be well below the federal-provincial rate in 
Canada. Some other measures to broaden the tax base could also be introduced, but these are 
unclear at this time.
The House of Representatives’ “Blueprint” proposes a federal corporate cash flow tax. The tax 
rate would be 20 per cent (about 26 per cent with state tax rates) and capital expenditures would 
be expensed (written off at a 100-per-cent rate, but interest would not be deductible). With capital 
expensing, oil investments in the U.S. could become more tax competitive than in Canada. In its 
original form, the House plan also mandated a shift towards so-called destination-based taxation 
via border adjustment, with imports being taxed and export sales exempted from the business 
tax, similar to Canada’s GST/HST. Under this proposal, this value-added tax (VAT) would be 
administered using the so-called subtraction method, by measuring value added on an accounts 
basis as the difference between revenues from sales minus purchases from other businesses. This is 
no different, in principle, than other VATs, including Canada’s GST, that rely on the credit-invoice 
method: taxes are levied on revenues and a credit is given for purchases from other firms (under 
VATs such as Canada’s GST/HST, imports are taxed at the border and exports are untaxed). Under 
the House proposal, labour compensation is expensed from the business tax base (unlike a VAT), 
but this would be similar to a subsidy or negative payroll tax for labour.3 The border-adjustment 
1 
See https://www.atkearney.com/gbpc/foreign-direct-investment-confidence-index. 
2 
Atlantic offshore oil (in Newfoundland and Labrador and Nova Scotia) enjoys an even lower tax burden compared to 
conventional oil in Western Canada due to the generous allowances for exploration and development under the Atlantic 
provinces’ rent-based royalty systems.
3 
See A. Auerbach et al (2017).
2proposal has been abandoned recently and therefore does not enter into our calculations.4 
Nonetheless, as seen below, U.S. competitiveness substantially improves because marginal 
investment would no longer be taxed with expensing, regardless of whether a border adjustment is 
made or not.
At this time, we do not know what will happen with the U.S. tax reform. Certainly, the president 
and the Republican party have made tax reform a major promise, so there will be significant 
pressure on politicians to deliver on this important election commitment. Many technical issues 
still need to be sorted out. Nonetheless, it is useful to understand the impact of U.S. policy 
changes on Canadian competitiveness if some configuration of the White House or House of 
Representatives plans are adopted. 
BACKGROUND
In 2012, The School of Public Policy published a study (Mintz and Chen, 2012) comparing the 
fiscal treatment and the overall tax burden on the upstream oil sector in Canada, the United States 
and four other oil-producing countries, using as a yardstick the marginal effective tax and royalty 
rate (METRR). Intuitively, the METRR represents the percentage of the gross-of-tax rate of return 
on the marginal project that goes towards paying taxes, royalties and other fiscal dues, before the 
project generates the required net-of-tax rate of return for its investors. 
We repeated this exercise in 2016 (Crisan and Mintz, 2016) when oil prices collapsed from US$100 
to US$50 per barrel. The lower price of oil raised the METRRs in jurisdictions charging gross 
royalties in fixed percentages, since royalties decreased less than profit margins did. As a result, 
the METRR in the U.S. states increased by almost four percentage points compared to 2012. With 
significantly lower royalty rates in 2016 versus 2012 due to the lower oil prices, we found that the 
METRRs in both Alberta and Saskatchewan dropped by approximately five percentage points, 
significantly boosting their competitiveness. 
The decrease in the METRR for conventional oil in Alberta from 40.3 per cent in 2012 to 35.0 per 
cent in 2016 was particularly remarkable, given that the newly elected NDP government had just 
raised the provincial corporate income tax rate by two percentage points, from 10 to 12 per cent, 
effective July 1, 2015, increasing the tax burden on all economic sectors.5 
A second electoral promise that Alberta’s NDP government followed through on was to undertake 
a comprehensive review of the royalties paid by the oil industry. Against what was perhaps the 
public’s expectation that this review would result in higher royalties to be paid by the oil industry, 
the review panel actually concluded that the royalty system in Alberta was not under-taxing 
the industry, given the increased competition that Alberta oil faced from other jurisdictions, in 
particular the U.S. Thus, instead of increasing royalties, the review panel recommended new, 
simplified formulas for calculating the royalties on conventional oil, which by and large resulted 
in lower royalties and lower METRRs for a wide range of economic scenarios. We found that the 
change in royalties was significant enough that it further decreased the METRR projected for 2017 
(when the new formulas would have taken full effect) by more than eight percentage points, to 26.7 
per cent, making Alberta one of the most competitive jurisdictions for conventional oil in North 
America, second only to Pennsylvania.
4 
The border-adjustment proposal faced intense resistance in net-importing states, as well as from consumer groups. Their 
opposition was based on their anticipation of increased prices, and the expectation that the U.S. dollar would not appreciate 
enough to fully offset the higher price of imports.
5 
See Philip Bazel and Jack Mintz (2016), for the impact of the increased corporate income tax in Alberta on the marginal 
effective tax rate in the manufacturing sector.
3Not much has happened since 2016 in the oil market or the fiscal regime for oil in Canada and 
U.S. The main change in the fiscal treatment of oil in Canada comes from the federal government, 
as announced in its 2017 budget. Citing the increased success in oil and gas exploratory drilling 
since the 1990s, the government announced a change in the fiscal treatment of expenses associated 
with successful oil and gas discovery wells. Rather than being immediately deducted as Canadian 
exploration expenses, they will be treated as Canadian development expenses, which means they 
are capitalized and amortized at a rate of 30 per cent per year. What this implies is that costs 
incurred with successful exploration cannot be deducted immediately and fully, but only gradually, 
resulting in total deductions in present value terms of only around 88 cents per dollar spent, thereby 
increasing the METRR on oil.
At provincial level, the most significant change is the decrease in Saskatchewan’s corporate income 
tax rate from 12 per cent to 11.5 per cent effective July 1, 2017, with a further decrease to 11 per 
cent announced for July 1, 2019. We include the lower rate of 11 per cent in our 2017 model, as 
firms’ investment generates income with a lag, which will be taxed at the low rate that has now 
been legislated. 
The House Republican Blueprint
As discussed above, the House Republicans’ “Blueprint” released in June 2016 recommends 
substantial changes to business taxation. In essence, it proposes a move towards cash-flow taxation 
by allowing immediate expensing of all capital spending (except land) while eliminating interest 
deductibility. The federal corporate tax rate would be set at 20 per cent, a significant drop from the 
present federal tax rate of 35 per cent.6 
The Trump Plan
President Trump’s tax-reform plan was launched in September 2015 during the presidential 
campaign as a set of principles intended to provide “tax relief for middle class Americans,” 
“simplify the tax code” and “grow the American economy.” In terms of business taxation, it 
proposed to cut the federal corporate income tax to 15 per cent. Although reference was made to 
broadening the tax base, no such measure has been proposed in detail, especially with respect to 
business income.7 Since then, president Trump has restated his general principles for tax reform 
in a series of speeches and a new outline released in April 2017. Although specific details remain 
unknown, the reduction of the corporate income tax rate to 15 per cent remains a key element of 
his plan.8
Currently, state corporate income taxes in the U.S. are generally lower than provincial rates in 
Canada. Only 43 states plus the District of Columbia levy corporate income taxes, ranging from 
4 per cent in North Carolina to 12 per cent in Iowa.9 And only four states and the District of 
Columbia levy corporate income taxes above 9 per cent. Another four states, including Texas, 
impose gross-receipts taxes on business instead of corporate income taxes, but at very low rates.10
6 
Based on PwC (2017). 
7 
Donald J. Trump website, “Trump Tax Reform That Will Make America Great Again,” available at https://assets.
donaldjtrump.com/trump-tax-reform.pdf.
8 
See Tax Policy Centre (2017).
9 
See Tax Foundation (2017).
10 
Nevada’s commerce tax in the mining sector is 0.051 per cent of a business’ gross tax receipts; Ohio’s commercial-activity 
tax top-tier rate is 0.26 per cent on gross receipts exceeding US$4 million; Texas’s franchise tax is 0.75 per cent of a taxable 
entity’s margin (which can be calculated in several ways, including as 70 per cent of total revenues or total revenues minus 
US$1 million); Washington’s business and occupation tax is 0.00484 per cent of gross receipts in the extracting sector.
4With the new federal rate at the same level as in Canada, Trump’s plan implies that combined 
corporate income tax rates will be lower in all states compared to the Canadian provinces. 
Figure 1 below summarizes our main findings for the current METRRs in Canada and the U.S. and 
the rates that would result under the two business reform plans currently under discussion in the 
U.S. Detailed results for the five Canadian provinces and five U.S. states considered are provided in 
the appendix.
FIGURE 1 MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX AND ROYALTY RATE BY JURISDICTION (IN PER CENT)
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Note: Bonus depreciation for eligible plant and equipment is not included in estimating the METRR for U.S. in 2017 since 
it is being phased out. However, its impact would reduce the METRR by 0.7 percentage points.
The METRR in Canada has increased slightly from 27.7 per cent in 2016 (including the new royalty 
formulas for conventional oil in Alberta) to 28.0 per cent in 2017, primarily due to the change in the 
treatment of exploration expenses announced by the federal government. The Canadian METRR 
is still considerably lower than the current METRR for oil in the U.S., but it is worth remembering 
that the low rate is in part due to the lower royalty rates payable in the largest two oil-producing 
provinces, Alberta and Saskatchewan, at the current depressed oil prices. If and when oil prices 
start to increase, the royalty rates and the METRRs in these provinces will adjust upward and the 
competitiveness of the Canadian oil will be affected.
More concerning, any of the two tax reform proposals in the U.S., or a hybrid formula between the 
two, will considerably reduce the METRR advantage that Canada currently enjoys, even at today’s 
low oil price. With the GOP “Blueprint” proposal in particular, the METRRs in Canada and U.S. 
will almost be at par.
It is perhaps surprising that the METRR in the U.S. will be lower under the House “Blueprint” than 
under the Trump plan, even though the latter entails the 15-per-cent corporate income tax versus 
the 20-per-cent tax proposed under the House plan. Despite the elimination of interest deduction 
and the higher corporate income tax rate compared to the Trump plan, the immediate deductibility 
of capital expenses under the House plan would result in a much more competitive tax regime in 
the United States. In fact, the move toward capital expensing together with the change in interest 
deductibility, even without the proposed corporate income tax cut from 35 to 20 per cent, would 
decrease the METRR in the U.S. by almost seven percentage points, to 29.2 per cent, below the 
proposed Trump plan. This shows that focusing solely on changes in statutory corporate income 
5tax rates can be misleading and comprehensive indicators like the marginal effective tax and 
royalty rate are necessary in order to assess the overall impact of complex tax changes.
At the provincial level in Canada, METRRs have generally increased slightly compared to 2016, by 
less than half of one percentage point, due to the new federal treatment of successful exploration 
expenses. The exceptions are Saskatchewan, where the announced decrease in the provincial 
corporate income tax rate exactly compensates for the federal change, and Nova Scotia, where 
the METRR was negative prior to the federal change. Conventional oil in Alberta remains the 
most competitive conventional oil in Canada, and more competitive than in Texas, North Dakota, 
Colorado, and Arkansas , but behind Pennsylvania. Under any of the two reform plans in the U.S., 
Alberta will lose its competitiveness against Colorado and Arkansas. Saskatchewan currently 
enjoys a tax advantage over Texas and neighbouring North Dakota, but this advantage would be 
lost under both the Trump reform plan and the House “blueprint.”
While the new federal tax treatment of successful exploration expenses in Canada reduces 
economic distortions with respect to the choice of assets, the timing might be inopportune. Given 
the uncertainties with respect to the U.S. tax reform, especially with respect to capital expensing, 
Canada might have to provide a far different response, perhaps reversing the 2017 budget changes. 
It was unfortunate that base broadening was primarily selected for the oil and gas industry in the 
last budget while other sectors were left unaffected. 
Our model does not include carbon taxes and regulations that impact the competitiveness of the 
oil sector in Canada. This will require going beyond measurements of the effective tax rate on 
investments, since carbon taxes and regulations affect other business costs. Further work will 
focus on the impact of taxes and regulations on the cost of production (including capital, labour 
and energy). 
CONCLUSIONS
Under the current tax policies affecting the upstream oil industry, Canadian oil extraction enjoys 
a considerably lighter tax burden versus the United States, with a marginal effective tax and 
royalty rate approximately eight-percentage-points lower. Alberta in particular currently offers the 
lowest METRR for conventional oil in the three Western provinces and four of the five U.S. states 
examined. But this comparative advantage is under threat given the tax-reform proposals advanced 
by the Republican party currently in power. 
Since the election campaign leading to the U.S. election in November 2016, President Trump has 
announced his intention of slashing the corporate income tax rate from 35 to 15 per cent, while 
potentially expanding the tax base. If his plan comes to fruition, the METRR in the U.S. would 
fall by almost five percentage points, from 36.1 to 31.2 per cent, still above the average Canadian 
METRR, but much closer than it is now.
Under the House Republicans’ “Blueprint,” the corporate income tax rate would be reduced to 
a more conservative 20 per cent, but combined with the proposal for immediate deductibility of 
capital expenses while eliminating the interest deductibility, the impact on the capital-intensive oil 
industry would be substantial. The average METRR in U.S. would fall to 28.6 per cent, less than 
one percentage point above the Canadian METRR of 28.0 per cent. 
More importantly, under both tax reform plans, the competitiveness of the two largest Canadian 
oil-producing provinces, Alberta and Saskatchewan, would significantly diminish. From one of the 
least taxed at current market prices, Alberta’s conventional oil would fall behind to somewhere in 
the middle of the pack, while Saskatchewan oil would go from the middle of the pack to becoming 
more taxed than in any of the five U.S. states considered. 
6The current results are derived using a benchmark oil price of US$50 per barrel. Any increase in 
the price of oil would further erode the competitiveness of Alberta and Saskatchewan through the 
automatic adjustment of the royalty rates. 
It is unclear at the moment what will be the final shape and form of the corporate tax reform 
in the U.S., but Republican politicians are under intense pressure to fulfil one of their most 
significant campaign promises. At the same time, a recent change introduced by the Canadian 
federal government that treats successful exploratory wells as development spending rather than 
exploration spending has already raised the METRR in Canada by close to half of one percentage 
point. Add in the lower regulatory burden on the oil industry in the U.S. and the absence there of 
any firm intentions to tax carbon, and the Canadian oil industry has significant reason to follow 
very closely the changes about to happen south of the border.
7APPENDIX
TABLE 1 MARGINAL EFFECTIVE TAX AND ROYALTY RATE BY JURISDICTION (IN PER CENT), 2017
Exploration Development Depreciable Inventory Aggregate
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
Canada 13.7 18.8 31.9 31.1 28.0
British Columbia 24.3 28.2 33.1 26.0 28.9
Alberta (Conventional Oil) 25.2 29.1 25.6 27.0 27.1
Alberta (Oil Sands) -1.0 5.6 34.8 34.9 29.6
Saskatchewan 28.5 32.1 36.1 27.3 32.6
Newfoundland & Labrador -3.0 3.9 50.4 N/A 12.1
Nova Scotia -6.1 -18.5 36.7 N/A -3.6
U.S. 2017 Actual 36.3 37.2 35.5 24.7 36.1
Arkansas 23.8 24.9 39.3 27.3 29.5
Colorado 28.4 29.4 36.5 26.3 31.5
North Dakota 35.7 36.6 35.4 26.1 35.8
Pennsylvania 18.9 20.1 38.0 29.3 26.0
Texas 37.4 38.2 35.4 24.1 36.8
U.S. “Blueprint” Proposal 34.4 34.5 17.5 26.5 28.6
Arkansas 21.5 21.6 22.6 29.1 22.1
Colorado 26.3 26.4 18.6 28.0 23.8
North Dakota 33.8 33.9 16.9 27.8 28.1
Pennsylvania 16.3 16.5 20.0 31.0 18.0
Texas 35.6 35.6 17.5 25.9 29.4
U.S. Trump Proposal 35.0 35.5 24.6 11.2 31.2
Arkansas 22.2 22.8 29.0 14.0 24.6
Colorado 27.0 27.5 25.6 12.9 26.4
North Dakota 34.4 34.9 24.2 12.7 30.7
Pennsylvania 17.0 17.8 26.8 16.3 20.6
Texas 36.2 36.6 24.7 10.5 32.0
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Global-Trump-Robertson.pdf
Colin Robertson | July, 2017
THE GROUND RULES FOR EFFECTIVE OBAS: PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING CARBON-PRICING COMPETITIVENESS CONCERNS THROUGH THE USE 
OF OUTPUT-BASED ALLOCATIONS
http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Effective-OBAs-Dobson-Fellows-Tombe-Winter.pdf
Sarah Dobson, G. Kent Fellows, Trevor Tombe and Jennifer Winter | June 2017
SOCIAL POLICY TRENDS- HOUSING AFFORDABILITY FOR FAMILIES WITH LOW INCOMES ACROSS CANADA
http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Social-Trends-Affordability-June-Final.pdf
Margarita Gres Wilkins | June 2017
WHERE IN THE WORLD ARE CANADIAN OIL AND GAS COMPANIES? 2013
http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/2013-Where-in-the-World-Hojjati-final.pdf
Niloo Hojjati | June 2017
WHERE IN THE WORLD ARE CANADIAN OIL AND GAS COMPANIES? 2012
http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/2012-Where-in-the-World-Hojjati-final.pdf
Niloo Hojjati | June 2017
WHERE IN THE WORLD ARE CANADIAN OIL AND GAS COMPANIES? 2011
http://www.policyschool.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/2011-Where-in-the-World-Hojjati-Horsfield-Jordison-final.pdf
Niloo Hojjati, Kai Horsfield and Shantel Jordison | June 2017
